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Abstract:
While the reliability of distributed-computing systems (DCSs) has been widely studied under the assumption that
computing elements (CEs) fail independently, the impact of correlated failures of CEs on the reliability remains
an open question. Here, the problem of modeling and assessing the impact of stochastic, correlated failures on
the service reliability of applications running on DCSs is tackled. The service reliability is modeled using an
integrated analytical and Monte-Carlo (MC) approach. The analytical component of the model comprises a
generalization of a previously developed model for reliability of non-Markovian DCSs to a setting where specific
patterns of simultaneous failures in CEs are allowed. The analytical model is complemented by a MC-based

procedure to draw correlated-failure patterns using the recently reported concept of probabilistic shared risk
groups (PSRGs). The reliability model is further utilized to develop and optimize a novel class of dynamic task
reallocation (DTR) policies that maximize the reliability of DCSs in the presence of correlated failures. Theoretical
predictions, MC simulations, and results from an emulation testbed show that the reliability can be improved
when DTR policies correctly account for correlated failures. The impact of correlated failures of CEs on the
reliability and the key dependence of DTR policies on the type of correlated failures are also investigated.
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SECTION 1. Introduction
Traditionally, the problem of modeling and analyzing reliability in DCSs in the presence of CE failures has been
tackled under the assumption that failures among CEs occur in a mutually-independent fashion. Under the
assumption of independent failures, the reliability of a DCS depends on both the number of CEs composing the
system and their individual likelihoods of failure. A vast amount of work has been developed under this
assumption, and several approaches to improve the reliability of applications executed on such systems have
been developed [1]–[2][3].
The assumption of independent failures of CEs greatly simplifies the analysis; however, such assumption may
not be realistic for the type of failures occurring in modern DCSs, which may include heterogeneous CEs, nonnegligible communication delays, unreliable CEs, unreliable communication links, and a dynamic topology that
changes in a random fashion. For instance, Schroeder et al. [4], Kondo et al. [5], Gallet et al. [6], and Joshi
et al. [7], analyzed different failure traces from large-scale high-performance computing (HPC) systems, Internet
distributed systems as well as DCSs, and all of them concluded independently that all those systems are affected
by frequent, correlated machine crashes and network failures that reduce the reliability of the entire system.
Further, it was stated that to improve, at no extra cost, the reliability of large-scale DCSs, the software managing
applications must provide means to compensate for correlated failures [5] [7].
DCSs that extend over large geographical areas, as in the case of donation grids and peer-to-peer (P2P) networks
for instance, can be vulnerable to large-scale failures resulting from massive communication network
malfunctions, wide-area power outages, wide-area natural disasters, or deliberate wide-area attacks to the
system infrastructure as those inflicted by weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and high-power
electromagnetic pulses. These events of stress occur at specific geographical locations and may induce
correlated failures that disrupt specific parts of the DCS. Correlated failures may not only inflict disturbance to
the system's availability but they may also induce further failures in other servers as a result of the lack of
reliable communication between the DCS components, especially in situations where any data exchange takes
large communication times [8]. In this work, we are interested in assessing the service reliability of DCSs in
scenarios where servers fail, without recovery, in a correlated manner.
This paper has two contributions: 1) modeling the service reliability of applications executed on DCSs in the
presence of correlated component failures by means of a hybrid analytical and MC-based approach, and 2)
optimizing the service reliability by means of DTR policies. The service reliability is modeled by extending our

analytical non-Markovian model in [9] to include specific group failures of CEs at each failure event. This
extension enables us to calculate the reliability conditional on the occurrence of a specific realization of
correlated CE failures. By averaging the conditional reliability over a large number of correlated-failure
realizations, the average service reliability of an application in the presence of correlated failures can be
estimated. To develop a statistical model for correlated failures we have adopted the concept of probabilistic
shared risk link group (SRLG), which was developed by the network-routing community and has been used it to
introduce correlation in a meaningful and practical manner by defining sets of CEs that may suffer from a
common stress event. To maximize the reliability of DCSs in the presence of correlated failures, a novel class of
DTR policies is also developed. The DTR policies exploit statistical knowledge on correlated failures to
preemptively redistribute tasks among the CEs with the goal of maximizing the service reliability of the
application. Results show that the benefit of DTR in improving reliability can be elevated when policies account
for the effects of correlated failures.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a brief survey of related work on modeling
correlated failures and assessing reliability in DCSs. In Section 3 we build a model for correlated failures and
introduce the hybrid analytical and MC-based approach for predicting the service reliability of a DCS. The
concept of correlated-failure-aware DTRs is introduced in Section 4. Section 5 presents our simulation results.
Finally, our conclusions are given in Section 6.

SECTION 2. Related Work
Correlated failures have been extensively studied in other areas outside the context of DCSs. A simple
taxonomy, based on the type of correlation exhibited by the failures, classifies correlated failures in temporal,
spatial, logical or any combination of them.
Temporal failure correlations have been analyzed mostly in an empirical manner. In [10] the effects of failure
patterns on the availability of a DCS's monitoring service were studied and simple techniques for improving the
robustness of the monitoring services were developed. In [6] the time-varying behavior of failures in large-scale
DCSs was empirically modeled from failure traces obtained from production systems. Zhang and Fu analyzed
node, cluster, and system-wide failure behaviors to predict and capture temporal failure correlations (at
different time scales) in a coalition cluster environment [11]. Spatially correlated failures have been modeled in
large-scale systems as well. In [6] spatially correlated failures were identified from real data using the following
intuitive approach: groups of failures occurring within a short time interval across the CEs were assumed to be
spatially correlated. Other modeling approaches have assumed that spatially correlated failures are induced by
massive events where a region containing several CEs are physically damaged [12]. Spatially correlated failures
have also been modeled in wireless sensor networks, where spatial-failure patterns were modeled assuming the
simultaneous failure of all the sensor nodes in a specific region [13].
Logical failure correlations have also been studied in DCSs, and have been obtained either from the logical data
dependencies of the applications or from the logical interconnection between hardware components.
Weatherspoon et al. analyzed logically correlated failures in P2P networks and developed a framework for
discovering groups of CEs that are maximally independent in their failure characteristics and clustered them to
compensate for correlated failures [14]. In [15] and [16], a software reliability modeling framework capable of
incorporating the dependencies among successive software runs was reported. In [17], Dai et al. evaluated the
reliability of a grid computing system considering the failure correlation of different subtasks executed by the
grid; however, component failures were assumed to be independent. Recently, approximate analytical
expressions for reliability in on-demand systems exhibiting correlated failures were presented [18].

Traces of real failures from several parallel, high- performance (HP), and distributed computing (DC)
environments have become available to researchers in the last years [4][19]. In [4], Schroeder et al. statistically
analyzed, and made public, traces of nine years of failures from a large HPC center. They noticed that the failure
time of CEs follows a Weibull distribution, while their recovery time follows a lognormal distribution. In the
context of correlated failures, Schroeder and Gibson noticed a certain degree of correlation between the failure
rate of a CE and the type and intensity of the workload running on it. Iosup et al. analyzed traces of the longterm availability in a large-scale experimental grid environment [20]. The authors studied the effect of
correlated failures in time, and built a failure model for the grid with no spatial correlation between the
occurrence of failures at the different sites of it. Kondo et al. characterized the time availability in an Internetbased DCS focusing on identifying patterns of correlated availability [5]. They also modeled the availability and
failure times in diverse DCSs; however, their analysis did not considered the effect of correlated failures [19].

SECTION 3. Modeling Reliability of DCSs in the Presence of Correlated
Failures
1. Problem Definition

This paper tackles the problem of improving the reliability of non-Markovian DCS, by means of task reallocation,
when failures in the CEs exhibit spatial correlation. We are particularly interested in improving the service
reliability, which is defined as the probability that a given application can be entirely executed by a DCS. The DCS
is assumed to be composed of n heterogeneous CEs, whose processing capabilities are of the processorconsistent type [21]; that is, the random time taken by any server to process any task follows a general
distribution and depends only upon the random service time of the server executing such task. Parallel
applications served by the DCS are assumed to belong to the class of applications with no data-dependence
constraints between operations. Moreover, applications are supposed to be partitioned, at time 𝑡𝑡 = 0,
into 𝑀𝑀 atomic tasks by an off-line application scheduler that allocates 𝑚𝑚𝑗𝑗 tasks at the queue of the 𝑗𝑗th server.
Further, all the CEs perform a synchronous DTR action at the prescribed time 𝑡𝑡 = 𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏 .

Finally, we have also assumed that the exchange of any task, or any group of tasks, among any pair of servers
experiences a stochastic communication delay. Such stochastic delays follow general distributions and depend
upon both the number of tasks exchanged among the servers as well as network-related parameters such as
heterogeneous end-to-end propagation times. We shall also assume that computing servers may fail
permanently in a correlated fashion (to be described later) at any random instant following the so-called crashstop failure model where tasks cannot be recovered from a failed server [22]. As a consequence, the application
being executed on the DCS cannot be completed if at least one task remains unprocessed at a failed CE.
Additionally, we further assume that small fixed-sized failure-notice (FN) messages are exchanged over the
network in order to detect and isolate failed servers. These FN messages too experience stochastic end-to-end
transfer delays that depend only on the end-to-end propagation time of each communication link. Finally, we
adopt the simplifying assumption that servers employ a reliable message-passing protocol to guarantee that
tasks are not discarded in situations such as a server failing while exchanges tasks with other servers.

1. Reliability in the Presence of Correlated Failures
2. Shared Risk Groups (SRGs) and Correlated Failures

We focus on modeling the service reliability in scenarios where servers fail without recovery. Specifically, we are
interested in correlated failures triggered by large-scale geographical attacks to the DCS infrastructure, which
diminish the ability of the DCS to reallocate tasks among CEs. Thus, we model the class of correlated failures
resulting from real-world massive disruptions and/or physical attacks to the DCS infrastructure. To do so, we

have taken from the network routing community the concept of SRLGs and adjusted it here to introduce
correlation in a meaningful and practical manner.
The concept of SRLG has successfully been used to address, in a systematic manner, the survivability of network
topologies in the presence of multiple correlated communication link failures [23]. The key idea in SRLGs is that
multiple yet different telecommunication services may be affected by a common network failure under the
proviso that they share a common failure risk, such as a fiber-optic link, a routing device, a routing domain, etc.
The consequence of a common risk failure is that all the services sharing the same risk would be affected or
even totally interrupted. In [24], the concept of probabilistic SRLG was introduced as a generalization of the
traditional SRLG to model stochastic failure events affecting the network topology, and upon the occurrence of a
SRLG failure event, the communication links associated to the group fail with some probability. Here we take
both concepts and redefine them to a DC environment.
Definition 1. A shared risk group in a DCS is a set of servers that may be affected by a common failure to the
infrastructure of the DCS under the condition that they share a common failure risk.
In DCSs examples of common failure risks are: (1) infrastructure anomalies, such as power outages or spikes; (2)
hardware failures, such as failures in memory modules, CPUs or even fans; (3) input/output errors, such as
failures at disk drives or drive controllers; (4) network failures, such as failures at FastEthernet o GigaEthernet
switches; and (5) software failures, such as failures at schedulers or distributed file systems. We note all these
types of failures are logged by DCSs following the trace format of The Failure Trace Archive [25]. In fact, by
examining traces in [25] from the HPC system at Los Alamos National Laboratory we have observed that the first
failure triggered by a power outage produced a correlated failure at the nodes identified as 655 and 782. Other
examples of real-world correlated failures found in the traces were triggered, for instance, by failures at UPSs
and fiber drives. Examples of common failure risks of interest to this paper are groups of CEs sharing a close
geographical area, groups of CEs within the same facility, groups of CEs facing a cyber attack to either the DCS,
their distributed operating system, their communication network, or their Internet service provider, etc. [26].
Suppose now that there exists a set 𝐴𝐴 of SRG events that may induce correlated failures to the DCS. Suppose
also that each event 𝐴𝐴 ∈ 𝒜𝒜 has a probability of occurrence of 𝜋𝜋(𝐴𝐴). Further, assume that the underlying
infrastructure of an 𝑛𝑛-server DCS is abstracted by a connected, undirected graph 𝐺𝐺 = (𝑉𝑉, 𝐸𝐸), where 𝑉𝑉 =
{1,2, … , 𝑛𝑛} is the set of CEs and 𝐸𝐸 ⊂ 𝑉𝑉 × 𝑉𝑉 is the set of communication links. Consequently, when the SRG
event 𝐴𝐴 happens, the set of servers 𝑉𝑉 can be partitioned into two sets: 𝑉𝑉𝐴𝐴 and 𝑉𝑉𝐴𝐴𝑐𝑐 , where the former set
denotes the collection of all servers sharing the common risk associated to the SRG event 𝐴𝐴 and the latter set
denotes all those servers unaffected by the event 𝐴𝐴.
Definition 2. A PSRG in a DCS is a set of servers that do fail with a positive failure probability, in the event of a
SRG failure. More precisely, the failure probability of the ith server, conditional on the SRG failure event 𝐴𝐴, is

denoted as 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴 i and satisfies: 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴 > 0 for all 𝑖𝑖 ∈ 𝑉𝑉𝐴𝐴 and 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴 = 0 otherwise.

Following [24], we assume that only one PSRG event may occur at a time, meaning that the PSRG failure events
are mutually exclusive, and consequently the following relationship holds: �𝐴𝐴∈𝒜𝒜 𝜋𝜋(𝐴𝐴) = 1. This otherwise
arbitrary definition has been effectively used in the routing community and makes sense in the context of the
class of failures regarded here [23]–[24][27].

Definition 3. We say that the servers 𝑖𝑖 and 𝑗𝑗 belonging to a DCS are correlated if 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴 and 𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗𝐴𝐴 are both positive for

the A PSRG. Moreover, upon the occurrence of the A SRG event, the probabilities 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴 and 𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗𝐴𝐴 are mutually

independent for all the pairs of servers in 𝑉𝑉𝐴𝐴 .

Suppose now that 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 is a binary random variable representing if the ith server has failed (“1”) or not (“0”). By
arranging the n binary random variables in vector form, we introduce the failure vector 𝐗𝐗 = (𝐗𝐗1 , 𝐗𝐗 2 , … , 𝐗𝐗 𝑛𝑛 ),
which takes values in {0,1}𝑛𝑛 , as the random vector defining the failure state of the DCS. Also, a realization of
the failure vector 𝐗𝐗 𝐴𝐴 is denoted by the binary vector 𝐱𝐱 and is termed as a failure. Finally as a more practical
matter, to generate samples of correlated failures given a specific probabilistic SRG event, it only suffices to
specify the probabilities 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴 , independently generate realizations for the 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴 random variables, and form the

vector 𝐱𝐱 𝐴𝐴 .

3. Service Reliability and Correlated Failures

In order to calculate the service reliability in the presence of spatially correlated failures, a hybrid analytical and
MC approach is presented. By drawing samples of correlated failures from the PSRG model, a large number of
realizations of correlated failure patterns can be generated. Thus, conditional on a particular failure pattern, an
analytical model for the conditional service reliability of a DCS can be derived as shown in Appendix A, which can
be found on the Computer Society Digital Library
at http://doi.ieeecomputersociety.org/10.1109/TPDS.2013.78. More precisely, conditional on a sample,
say, 𝐗𝐗 𝐴𝐴 = 𝐱𝐱 𝐴𝐴 , of correlated failures induced by the occurrence of the APSRG event, the system of recursive
integral equations (9), with initial conditions (10), presented in Appendix A, available in the online supplemental
material, can be used to compute the conditional service reliability.
In brief, we can estimate the service reliability of a DCS in the presence of correlated failures induced by
an 𝐴𝐴 PSRG event as follows. Let 𝑘𝑘 be the 𝑘𝑘 th sample of correlated failures induced by the occurrence of
the 𝐴𝐴 PSRG event, with 𝑘𝑘 = 1,2, … , 𝜅𝜅. Let also 𝑅𝑅ℓ0,𝑘𝑘 (𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏 |𝐗𝐗 𝐴𝐴 = 𝐱𝐱 𝐴𝐴 ) be the service reliability of the DCS when
servers perform a synchronous DTR action at time 𝑡𝑡 = 𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏 , the initial system configuration is as specified by ℓ0,
and the kth sample of correlated failures induced by the occurrence of the 𝐴𝐴 PSRG event is as specified

by 𝐗𝐗 𝐴𝐴 = 𝐱𝐱 𝐴𝐴 . The service reliability of the DCS in the presence of correlated failures induced by the occurrence

of the 𝐴𝐴 PSRG event, 𝑅𝑅ℓ𝐴𝐴0 (𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏 ), can be estimated by simply averaging over the 𝜅𝜅 samples of correlated failures:

1

𝑅𝑅ℓ𝐴𝐴0 (𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏 ) ≈ ∑𝜅𝜅𝑘𝑘=1
𝜅𝜅

𝑅𝑅ℓ0 ,𝑘𝑘 (𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏 |𝐗𝐗 𝐴𝐴 = 𝐱𝐱 𝐴𝐴 ). (1)

SECTION 4. Correlated-Failure—Aware DistributedTask Reallocation Policy
In [9] [28] we developed a flexible class of DTR policies. Each policy in the class estimates, at 𝑡𝑡 = 𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏 , the
amount of load imbalance, 𝐿𝐿𝑗𝑗𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 (𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏 ), that each server has with respect to the estimated total system
^

load, 𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 (𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏 ). The imbalance estimation criterion considers a general parameter, denoted as Λ𝑗𝑗 , which
represents different choices for the imbalance criterion, such as the relative computing power and the
individual reliability of the CEs. Once the imbalance criterion is defined, each unbalanced server determines
the initial amount of tasks to reallocate among the remaining servers in the system. This step is carried out
by partitioning the excess load among all the candidate task-receiver servers:
(0)
𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖

≡

(0)
𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏 )

^

= �𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖 (𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏 ) − Λ𝑗𝑗 𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 (𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏 )/ ∑ℓ∈𝒲𝒲𝑗𝑗 Λ ℓ � , (2)

(0)

where ⌊⋅⌋ is the floor function and 𝑚𝑚𝑗𝑗 (𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏 ) is the load at the jth server at time 𝑡𝑡 = 𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏 . The values 𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 are

initial values for the partition of tasks at an unbalanced server.

To develop a DTR policy accounting for correlated failures, the ideas of PSRGs and correlation introduced in
Definitions 2 and 3 must be considered. Here we have modified the general DTR policy and created a
correlated-failure-aware policy by proposing the following reallocation criterion:
𝑓𝑓

Λ𝑗𝑗 = 𝜆𝜆𝑑𝑑𝑗𝑗 �1 − 𝜆𝜆𝑗𝑗 / �
𝑓𝑓

𝑘𝑘∈𝑉𝑉

𝑓𝑓

𝜆𝜆𝑘𝑘 � (1 − 𝜋𝜋(𝐴𝐴))�1 − 𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗𝐴𝐴 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴 �, (3)

where 𝜆𝜆𝑑𝑑𝑗𝑗 j and 𝜆𝜆𝑗𝑗 are, respectively, the processing speed and the failure rate of the 𝑗𝑗th CEs. The idea

behind this definition for the reallocation policy is to favor the migration of tasks from overloaded servers
to those CEs that are less vulnerable to fail in a correlated manner given the PSRG event 𝐴𝐴, while
simultaneously penalize the migration of tasks to those CEs that are correlated, in the sense of Definition 3.
Note that the processing speed of the servers as well as the failure rates are still considered in the
definition of the reallocation criterion. When failures are uncorrelated the term 𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗𝐴𝐴 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴 is zero as a
consequence of Definition 2, and the proposed policy becomes proportional to: (1) the likelihood of not
𝑓𝑓

occurrence of the PSRG event 𝐴𝐴; and (2) 𝜆𝜆𝑑𝑑𝑗𝑗 �1 − 𝜆𝜆𝑗𝑗 / �

𝑘𝑘∈𝑉𝑉

for the independent failure case defined in [28], Section 2.2.

𝑓𝑓

𝜆𝜆𝑘𝑘 �, which is exactly the reallocation policy

Note that in the development of the hybrid analytical and MC model for the service reliability, the DTR
policy executed by the servers at time 𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏 has been considered as a parameter. We include such
parameterization in the notation of the service reliability as 𝑅𝑅ℓ𝐴𝐴0 (𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏 ; 𝐋𝐋) ≡ 𝑅𝑅ℓ𝐴𝐴0 (𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏 ), where 𝐋𝐋is an 𝑛𝑛-by𝑛𝑛 matrix whose 𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 th element denotes the number of tasks to be reallocated from the 𝑖𝑖th to the 𝑗𝑗th server
at time 𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏 . More importantly, we can exploit such parameterization to pose an optimization problem that
allow us to optimally migrate tasks among the CEs such that the service reliability of the DCS, in the
presence of correlated failures, can be maximized. Mathematically, the following mixed-integer
optimization problem can be stated:

subject to

(𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏∗ , 𝐋𝐋∗ ) = arg 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝑅𝑅ℓ𝐴𝐴0 (𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏 ; 𝐋𝐋), (4)
(𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏 ,𝐋𝐋)

𝑛𝑛

�

𝑗𝑗=1,𝑗𝑗≠𝑖𝑖

𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ≤ 𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖 , 𝑖𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑛𝑛 , (5)

𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∈ {0,1, … , 𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖 }, 𝑖𝑖, 𝑗𝑗 = 1, … , 𝑛𝑛, 𝑖𝑖 ≠ 𝑗𝑗, (6)
𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏 ≥ 0. (7)

The problem has 𝑛𝑛(𝑛𝑛 − 1) non-negative integer-valued variables, one non-negative real-valued variable
and 𝑛𝑛2 + 1 restrictions. This type of optimization problem is known to be NP-hard due to the
combinatorial explosion of the search space; the efficient search algorithm based on a pairwise

decomposition of the DCS presented in [28] has been employed here to find feasible DTR policies
maximizing the service reliability of a DCS in the presence of correlated failures.
We note that the proposed algorithm scales linearly in both the number of servers in the DCS and the
number of tasks queued at the overloaded server. This claim is justified as follows. Suppose that the 𝑗𝑗th
server is unbalanced and must reallocate tasks to 𝜂𝜂 servers, where the relationship 0 < 𝜂𝜂 < 𝑛𝑛 holds. Since
the DTR policy executed by the servers is distributed, each one must solve (9) and (10) independently.
For 𝑛𝑛 = 2 servers, the complexity in solving such equations is a function of the number of tasks queued at
the 𝑗𝑗th server, that is 𝒪𝒪(𝑓𝑓(𝑚𝑚𝑗𝑗 )). Since the 𝑗𝑗th server decomposes the DCS into 𝜂𝜂 pairs of DCSs, the
overloaded server must solve at most 𝜂𝜂 times the optimization problem (4) for 𝑛𝑛 = 2. Further, by
construction the algorithm must solve, at the 𝑗𝑗th server, no more than 𝑁𝑁 times such optimization problem.
From this, we observe that the complexity of the algorithm is 𝒪𝒪 �𝑁𝑁 (𝑛𝑛 − 1)𝑓𝑓�𝑚𝑚𝑗𝑗 ��. In addition, if an

exhaustive search in the number of tasks to reallocate is conducted, then 𝑓𝑓(𝑚𝑚𝑗𝑗 ) is bounded by mjbecause
no more than 𝑚𝑚𝑗𝑗 tasks must be reallocated.

SECTION 5. Results

1. Small-Scale Experiments
In this section the service reliability of a small-scale DCSs with a representative network topology has been
analyzed. The DCS corresponds to a 20-node, nationwide distributed system where servers are located at
several cities in the US as shown in Fig. 1. In our calculations we have considered two classes of CEs: HP
servers and standard servers. Since in a DCS HP servers are expected to serve more tasks than standard CEs,
they are supplied with a larger number of communication links. In particular, all those servers with five or
more communication links in the topologies depicted in Fig. 1 are regarded as HP servers. Due to
geographical proximity, in the DCS with 20-node servers the following PSRGs have been defined: PSRG-1
composed of servers 10, 11, 17, and 19; PSRG-2 composed of servers 1 and 7; PSRG-3 composed of servers
6 and 8; and PSRG-4 composed of servers 4, 5, 9, and 18. For simulation purposes, we suppose that each
DCS may be affected only by four different PSRGs events, each one of them associated to PSRGs 1 to 4 and
each one of them having a likelihood of occurrence of 𝜋𝜋(𝐴𝐴) = 0.25.

Fig. 1. Topology of a sample small-scale DCS.

The non-Markovian stochastic dynamics of DCSs have been simulated assuming that both, the service and
the task transfer times, follow Pareto distributions. Pareto distributions have been selected because, after
experimentally characterizing the dynamics of the testbed DCS described in Appendix B, available in the
online supplemental material, the empirical probability distribution functions (pdfs) of service and task
transfer times are best fitted by Pareto distributions. The average task-processing time of the HP servers
was set to 1 s, while the standard deviation of the task-processing time was set to 0.25 s. The average taskprocessing time of the standard servers was set to ten times the average task-processing time of the HP

servers, and their standard deviation was set to 4 seconds. For the task transfer times, we follow [28]to
introduce meaningful communication delays and define the average task-transfer time to be five times the
average service time of the standard (slowest) servers. Further, the mean transfer time of 𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 tasks from

the 𝑖𝑖 th server to the 𝑗𝑗th, 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 , is calculated as 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 , where 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 and 𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 are positive constants
that depend on the link connecting the 𝑖𝑖 th and the 𝑗𝑗th servers. The parameters 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 and 𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 were set to 1
second per task and 2 seconds, respectively, as in [28].

Regarding failure times, we follow the results in [19] [20] and assume that the failure times in both cases,
correlated and independent failures, follow Weibull distributions with the same average failure times, that
is, the average failure time of a server that crashes independently is 600 s, while the average failure time of
all those servers in a PSRG crashing simultaneously on the occurrence of a PSRG event is also 600 s. In
addition, we have considered a scenario of relatively small and uniform failure probability for the servers
conditional on a PSRG, namely, 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴 = 0.35 for all 𝑖𝑖 . To make fair comparisons, in our simulations we have
adjusted the average number of failed servers to be the same for the cases of correlated and independent
failures.
Regarding the workload processed by the DCSs, we assume in our calculations that an application
composed of 𝑀𝑀 = 5,000 tasks is allocated onto the CEs at time 𝑡𝑡 = 0. We have considered four different
initial allocations. The initial task allocations labeled as Uniform-1, Uniform-2, and Uniform-3 correspond,
respectively, to an initial uniform allocation of tasks onto all the CEs, onto the HP servers only, and onto the
standard CEs only, while the allocation labeled as Computing-Power corresponds to an initial allocation of
tasks proportional to the relative processing speed of the CEs. In addition, a DTR policy with a reallocation
criterion based solely on the relative processing speed of the CEs has been considered. All the estimated
values reported here correspond to centers of intervals with 95 percent confidence, over which the
estimates will not differ from the true value more than 5 percent.
Table 1 lists the optimal service reliability, for the four different initial task allocation considered, and for
both cases independent and correlated failures. In the case of independent failures, the optimal service
reliability was calculated by means of the pairwise decomposition of a DCS presented in [28]. In the case of
correlated failures, the optimal service reliability was approximated by first generating a sample of PSRG
correlated failures and, next, the conditional service reliability was calculated analytically by solving (9) and
(10), and finally (1) was used to compute the estimated service reliability for a fixed DTR policy. It can be
observed from Table 1 that, in spite of the DTR and the average number of failures are the same, PSRG
correlated failures diminish the service reliability as compared to the case of independent failures. For the
cases presented here, as a result of correlation in the failures, the service reliability has been reduced up to
21 percent for the 20-node DCS. The reduction in the service reliability is explained by the fact that the
likelihood of failure of an HP server increases when correlated failures induced by a PSRG affect a DCS, as
compared to the case of independent failures. For independent failures, any server may fail in the system;
however, when a PSRG affects a DCS only a specific subset of servers is prone to fail. Recall that the average
number of failures is the same for both independent and correlated failures, and recalling also that each
PSRG, with the exception of PSRG-1 in the 20-node DCS, contains one or two HP servers. Thus, it can be
easily observed that the likelihood of failure of an HP server increases in the presence of correlated failures
induced by a PSRG. The same ideas explain also why independent and correlated failures yield
approximately the same service reliability for the 20-node DCS in the case of the PSRG-1 event. In Appendix
C, available in the online supplemental material, the negative effects of correlated failures induced by PSRG
events on the average fraction of tasks served by the DCS are presented in detail as an additional result.

TABLE 1 The Service Reliability of Small- and Large-Scale Dcss in the Presence of Both Independent and Spatially
Correlated Failures
20-node DCS
Initial Allocation
Uniform 1
Uniform 2
Uniform 3
Comp-Pwr.
Gnd5000 DCS
Initial Allocation
Uniform
Comp-Pwr

PSRG-1
Indep.
0.835
0.787
0.820
0.877

Corr.
0.830
0.785
0.818
0.874

PSRG-2
Indep.
0.869
0.812
0.850
0.897

Corr.
0.681
0.653
0.673
0.681

PSRG-3
Indep.
0.866
0.829
0.852
0.889

Corr.
0.694
0.649
0.682
0.691

PSRG-4
Indep.
0.822
0.794
0.813
0.874

Corr.
0.775
0.701
0.746
0.757

PSRG-1.
Indep
0.791I
0.913

Corr
0.527
0.602

PSRG-2
Indep
0.762
0.905

Corr
0.646
0.692

PSRG-3
Indep
0.781
0.927

Corr
0.629
0.688

PSRG-4
Indep
0.794
0.916

Corr
0.582
0.657

We show in Fig. 2a the service reliability of the DCS as a function of the DTR policy, when the initial task
allocation is Uniform-2 and the PSRG event 2 induces correlated failures in the system. The DTR policy is
represented in the figure as the ratio of tasks exchanged among all the CEs. Since in the Uniform-2
allocation tasks are initially sitting at the standard CEs, the DTR policy showed in the figure corresponds to
the case of transferring tasks from standard servers to HP servers. Results suggest that the service
reliability, in the presence of correlated failures generated by a PSRG event, may drop between 5 and 25
percent as compared to the case of independent-failures. Once again, this result is attributed to the fact
that, when correlated failures occur, it is more likely that an HP server fails as compared to the likelihood of
failure of HP servers when independent failures affect the DCS. Moreover, Fig. 2a also illustrates the effect
of properly selecting the number of tasks to migrate among the CEs: when the task transfer delays are
negligible compared to the average service times of tasks, the optimal DTR policy corresponds to the initial
partition specified by (2). However, when the task-transfer delays are not negligible, as in the example
shown here, such selection is no longer optimal and by transferring only 95 percent (90 percent) of the
tasks as specified by (2), a maximal service reliability of 0.812 (0.653) is achieved when independent
(correlated) failures affect DCS's dynamics. In Fig. 2 b the service reliability of the DCS in the presence of
both independent and correlated failures is depicted as a function of the instant when the DTR policy is
executed by the CEs. Results suggest that an excessive delay in executing the DTR policy has the effect of
considerably reducing the service reliability regardless of the type of failure affecting the DCS.

Fig. 2. The service reliability of the small-scale DCS as a function of the: (a) fraction of tasks reallocated; and (b)
instant when the DTR policy is executed.

In order to experimentally validate our theory we coded the DTR policy for maximizing the service reliability
on the testbed DCS described in Appendix B, available in the online supplemental material, and emulated
the 20-node DCS shown in Fig. 1. In order to yield predictions for the service reliability, the random times
driving the dynamics of the testbed must be first experimentally characterized. To do so, Pareto
distributions were fitted for the service times and transfer times of the testbed. The average service times,
the average transfer times, and the 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 and 𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 parameters were estimated using maximum likelihood
estimators as in [28]. From the experimental characterization, we have adjusted the DC application so that
the average service times at the CEs are between 5 and 10 seconds for the standard servers and between 1
and 1.5 seconds for the HP servers. Also, traffic shapers have been set so that the estimated 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 and 𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
parameters are between 5 and 10 seconds per task, and 1 to 3 seconds, respectively. The initial workload in
the DCS was set to 2,000 tasks, the failure times of the CEs failing in a correlated manner was assumed to
follow Weibull distributions with average failure times of 400 s. As in simulations, we considered a scenario
of relatively small and uniform failure probability for the CEs, conditional on a PSRG, i.e., 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴 = 0.35 for
all 𝑖𝑖 . Also, to make fair comparisons, we have adjusted the average number of failed CEs to be the same for
the cases of correlated and independent failures. In the experimental setup, the reliability was calculated
by averaging a total of 500 independent realizations of failure patterns for each policy, while in the case of
the theoretical predictions 10,000 realizations of independent failures patterns were employed for each
policy.

Fig. 3 shows the theoretical predictions and the experimental results for the service reliability in the
presence of PSRG-2 correlated failures, as a function of the fraction of tasks reallocated among the servers,
when the Uniform-1 initial task allocation was employed to partition the application at time 𝑡𝑡 = 0. As in
the case of simulations, in Fig. 3 two types of DTR policies have been considered: one that disregards the
fact that failures occur in a correlated manner (labeled as “CF-Unaware”) and another policy accounting for
correlated failures (labeled as “CF-Aware”). First, observe that Fig. 3visually suggests a fairly good
agreement between the theoretical predictions and the experimental results. This subjective assessment is
confirmed by the fact that maximum absolute errors smaller than 4 percent have been obtained between
the theoretical and curves obtained from the emulated DCS. As before, we see that if a DTR policy does not
take into account the effects of correlated component failures then the service reliability is reduced by up
to 22 percent. The larger reduction in the service reliability is observed in an operational regime where
more tasks are exchanged among servers. Last, in Table 2 we list the maximal service reliability for both the
correlated-failure-unaware and the correlated-failure-aware DTR policies for different initial allocation of
tasks of the 2,000 tasks, when PSRG-2 events induce correlated failures. The optimal values for the service
reliability have been obtained by solving the optimization problem (4). Table 2 shows that regardless of
how the tasks have been initially allocated onto the servers, the service reliability is indeed greater when a
DTR policy exploits the knowledge about the correlated component failures occurring in the system.

Fig. 3. The service reliability as a function of fraction of tasks reallocated among the CEs, when independent and
correlated failures affect an emulated DCS.
TABLE 2 Maximal Service Reliability for Two Types of DTR Policies and Different Initial Allocation of Tasks
Initial load Maximal Service Reliability
Theoretical
Emulated
CF-Aware
CF-Unaware CF-Aware CF-Unaware
Uniform 1 0.795
0.653
0.772
0.667
Uniform 2 0.786
0.640
0.791
0.669
Uniform 3 0.751
0.622
0.772
0.614
Comp-Pwr. 0.702
0.608
0.726
0.615

Finally, we present in Appendix C, available in the online supplemental material, experiments conducted
over a 38-nodes DCS, which show the diminishing effects of correlated failures on the service reliability.

1. Large-Scale Experiments
In order to study the effect of correlated failures in a more realistic scenario, we have analyzed the largescale grid computing system called Grid5000 [29]. Grid5000 is a computing grid geographically distributed
across nine cities, termed as sites, and composed of 15 clusters with a total number of 1,288 nodes. For
simplicity, we have studied here Grid5000's behavior in the presence of correlated failures at the cluster
level, that is, we considered the Grid5000 as a 15 server DCS where each one of the 15 servers summarizes
the behavior of all the nodes forming the corresponding cluster. Since Grid5000 is geographically
distributed across nine different sites, which host one or more clusters per site, we have defined PSRGs for
all those sites containing two or more clusters. Thus, the so-called PSRG-1 is composed of clusters 1 to 4,
the PSRG-2 is composed of clusters 7 and 8, the PSRG-3 is composed of clusters 9 and 10, while the PSRG-4
is composed of clusters 11 and 12. The remaining clusters (5, 6, 13, 14, and 15) are not associated to any
SRGs and we have assumed that they fail independently. Based on this definition of PSRGs, we suppose
that Grid5000 may be affected by four different PSRG events, each one of them associated to PSRGs 1 to 4.
The likelihood of occurrence of each PSRG event is 𝜋𝜋(𝐴𝐴) = 0.25.

To model the dynamics of the 15 clusters in Grid5000, we downloaded traces from The Grid Workload
Archive, [30], and The Failure Trace Archive [25]. We pooled samples of all the nodes forming a cluster and
employed parametric as well as non-parametric pdf estimation methods to fit proper distributions for both,
the task execution times and the failure times, at the cluster level. Heterogeneity was introduced in the
task execution times by filtering out the data, using the “Application class” field provided in the traces, and
considering only those 15 application classes with larger number of samples. Table 6 in Appendix C,
available in the online supplemental material, lists statistics and the fitted distributions for servers’ task
execution times in Grid5000. Note that, at the cluster level, average task service times are highly
heterogeneous as observed in Table 6 and as indicated by a coefficient of variation of 1.985. The
heterogeneity in the service times is also observed noting that such times seem to follow different
parametric distributions, such as Gamma, Extreme Value, and Pareto, as well as non-parametric
distributions, such as mixtures of two and four Gaussian kernels.
Regarding failure times, we also pooled samples of all the nodes in a cluster and filtered out the data to
consider only the availability times of the 15 clusters. In Table 6 statistics as well as the fitted distributions
for the failure times in Grid5000 are listed. We note that, at the cluster level, the average failure times in
Grid5000 are more-or-less homogeneous with a coefficient of variation of 0.645. To establish fair
comparisons and simplify our simulations, the failure time of all the clusters within a PSRG is assumed to
follow the distribution with the largest average failure time. In addition, as in the previous examples, we
have considered a scenario of relatively small yet uniform failure probability for the clusters, conditional on
a PSRG. We assumed that the ith cluster in a PSRG may fail with a probability of 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴 = 0.35 for all 𝑖𝑖 .
Regarding task transfer times, we safely assumed that communication delays are negligible due to sites in

Grid5000 are interconnected using high-speed VLANs at a speed of 1 Gbps. Further, we assumed also that
the topology of the network is a full-mesh.
As in the previous simulations, and in order to establish fair comparisons, we have adjusted the average
number of failed servers to be the same for the cases of correlated and independent failures. The workload
to be processed by the Grid5000 DCSs is composed of 𝑀𝑀 = 100,000 tasks, which are allocated onto the
servers, at time 𝑡𝑡 = 0, using an uniform allocation of tasks, labeled as “Uniform,” and an allocation
proportional to the relative processing speed of the clusters, labeled as “Computing-Power.” Note that, on
average, the simulated Grid5000 DCS is capable of serving a workload of approximately 190,000 tasks.
Regarding the DTR policy, we have employed again a reallocation criterion based on the relative processing
speed of the servers.
In Table 1 we have also listed the optimal service reliability for the two different initial task allocations
considered, and when independent and correlated failures affect the Grid5000 DCS. As in the case of the
20-node DCSs, results in Table 1 show that, regardless of the DTR policy employed by the system,
correlated failures heavily reduce the service reliability as compared to the case of independent failures.
Results also show that the largest reduction in the service reliability occurs when the PSRG-1 is affected by
correlated failures. This is attributed to the following issues. First, a correlated failure occurring at the
PSRG-1 produces the simultaneous failure of four clusters, meaning that about 25 percent of the total
number of clusters in the DCS becomes unavailable. Second, the four clusters in the PSRG-1 have a
combined processing power of 0.886 tasks per second, which represents 60 percent of the total computing
power of the DCS. Third, the DTR policy used by the DCS reallocates more workload onto the clusters 3, 4,
and 12 since they have the largest processing speeds. Consequently, a correlated failure at the PSRG-1
reduces the likelihood of serving the workload because of the simultaneous reduction in the number of
available clusters, the large reduction in the processing power of the Grid5000 DCS, and the incorrect
reallocation of workload onto clusters that are prone to fail in a correlated manner. We comment that the
second larger reduction in the service reliability occurs when correlated failures affect the PSRG-4. Such a
reduction is explained because: 1) PSRG-4 has a combined processing power of 0.550 tasks per second,
which represents about 37 percent of the total computing power of the DCS; and 2) PSRG-4 contains cluster
12, which has the second larger processing speed in the system, making such cluster an excellent candidate
cluster to receive reallocated workload.

1. Discussion
The reduction in the service reliability in the presence of correlated failures is a consequence of using a
non-suitable DTR policy, which is not aware of the type of correlation present in the failure patterns. In
order to observe the effect on the service reliability of including the information about the correlation
induced by PSRG in the failure patterns, we compare the DTR reallocation criterion based solely on the
processing speed of servers (labeled as “CF-Unaware”) and a DTR with a correlated-failure-aware policy
(labeled as “CF-Aware”) that we proposed in (3). In this example (as in the previous cases), the workload is
distributed at time 𝑡𝑡 = 0 using four different allocations. The comparison results are listed in Table 3. It can
be clearly observed that by including the information about the correlation induced by the PSRGs into a
DTR policy a considerable increase in the service reliability is obtained as compared to a policy that neglects
such information. Moreover, by comparing Tables 1 and 3 it can be observed that for the 20-node DCS, the
optimal values for reallocating tasks dictated by the correlated-failure-aware DTR policy increase the
service reliability to a level which is almost the same as in the case of independent failures, thereby
compensating the negative impact induced by correlated failures on the system's reliability. This
compensation effect is achieved because the correlated-failure-aware policy does: 1) smartly move the

calculations (tasks) away from those servers that are prone to fail in a correlated manner, to all those
servers that do not share the same likelihood of failure; and 2) simultaneously leave a small fraction of the
load on those servers that may fail in a correlated manner, thereby exploiting their computing capabilities.
These two features of the correlated-failure—aware DTR policy devised in this paper are key, since they
represent the fundamental tradeoff appearing in DC in the presence of correlated failures. On one hand,
migrating less tasks among the CEs is suitable in scenarios when CEs work independently; as such, the
effect of correlated failures can be partially compensated. On the other hand, migrating more tasks among
the CEs is suitable for cooperative work and it increases the coupling between the CEs, which, in turn, has a
negative effect on the reliability if correlated failures are not accounted for in a DTR policy. As an additional
result, in Appendix C, available in the online supplemental material, we compare the CF-Aware and the CFUnaware DTR policies and their effect of the service reliability for the case of the Uniform-2 initial task
allocation.
TABLE 3 Service Reliability of Small- and Large-Scale DCSs Achieved by Correlated-Failure Aware and Unaware
DTR Policies
LU-node UL
PSRG-1
PSRG-2
Initial Allocation DTR policy
DTR policy
CF-Aware CF-Unaware CF-Aware CF-Unaware
Uniform 1
0.841
0.830
0.823
0.681
Uniform 2
0.775
0.785
0.801
0.653
Uniform 3
0.819
0.818
0.810
0.673
Comp-Pwr.
0.877
0.874
0.837
0.681
PSRG-3
PSRG-4
Initial Allocation DTR policy
DTR policy
CF-Aware CF-Unaware CF-Aware CF-Unaware
Uniform 1
0.831
0.694
0.846
0.775
Uniform 2
0.809
0.649
0.828
0.701
0.814
Uniform 3
0.817
0.682
0.746
Comp-Pwr.
0.825
0.691
0.829
0.757
Gnd5000 DCS
P KG-1
PSRG-2
Initial Allocation DTR policy
DTR policy
CF-Aware CF-Unaware CF-Aware CF-Unaware
Uniform
0.631
0.527
0.660
0.646
Comp-Pwr.
0.781
0.602
0.796
0.692
PSRG-3
PSRG-4
Initial Allocation DIR policy
DIR policy
CF-Aware CF-Unaware CF-Aware CF-Unaware
Unitorm
0.671
0.629
0.644
0.584
Comp-Pwr.
0.791
0.688
0.795
0.657

For the Grid5000 DCS, we note that the use of the correlated-failure—aware DTR policy enhances the
service reliability of the system up to 28 percent, as compared to the use of a policy that unwisely
disregards the effect of correlated failures. Unlike the case of the 20-node DCS, the maximal service
reliability yielded by the correlated-failure—aware DTR policy does not achieve the same level of reliability
as in the case of independent failures. This is due to the fact that those clusters with the larger individual
and combined processing capabilities are more likely to fail in a correlated manner because they belong to
the PSRG-1 and to the PSRG-4. Thus, the correlated-failure—aware policy is severely constrained and
cannot reallocate enough tasks to the fastest clusters in the system, and consequently, it is capable of only
partially compensating for the negative impact of correlated failures on the system's reliability.

SECTION 6. Conclusions
This paper sheds light on the impact of spatially correlated failures on the reliability of DCSs and presents
strategies for how to mitigate the adverse effects of correlated failures using simple preemptive DTR
policies that are aware of the failure statistics. The concept of SRLG, which is used in the routing community
as an effective mechanism to model and simulate correlated failures, has been adapted in this paper to
introduce the idea of PSRGs. Under this concept, correlated failures resulting from real-world massive
disruptions and/or physical attacks to the DCS infrastructure can be modeled, and correlation can be
introduced by defining or identifying those CEs that may suffer from a common stress event.
The effects of correlated failures on the service reliability have been investigated thoroughly using the
proposed reliability model. Results show that correlated failures reduce both the service reliability and the
average number of tasks executed by a DCS as compared to scenarios of independent failures. Notably, a
correlated-failure—aware DTR policy has been proposed in order to enhance the service reliability of the
system. Moreover, it has been observed that the optimal selection of the number of tasks to be reallocated
among the CEs depends upon the degree of correlation in the failures.
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